Since the interwar period, the Potency of airpower has gone through periods of being overestimated followed by underestimation. These periods of estimations have mostly the results of the military perspective on air power and how it affects and influences the battle space on the tactical, operational and strategic level. While the estimation of military value and the true effect of air campaigns have varied over the years, the political effects of air campaigns on an enemy have consistently been overrated by both western and eastern powers.
As von Clausewitz stated War is an extension of politics by other means. Air campaigns in isolation have consistently failed to achieve the political objectives they have set out to accomplish even when they exceed military expectations. North Vietnam was not bombed into submission. Iraq had to be invaded. Ukraine has not surrendered Iran’s government was not toppled and the VVS and USAF could not bring the Afghans to heel. This is despite the fact that these Air forces have been effective at supporting their ground forces.
Air campaigns fail to achieve their objectives because they are often applying military theory and doctrine to achieve political objectives. Air campaigns do not hold ground, which often contributes to the failure of the air campaign. An Air campaign because it can hold territory cannot systematically tear down the regime in the country and cannot destroy an enemies internal forces which’s allows existing power structures to remain intact. A good example of this is the types of targets generally attacked in the beginning of an air campaign sites like telecommunications nodes military command centers. The destruction of these targets can severely limit a enemy’s ability to coordinate a response to a ground attack by conventional or irregular forces, but it doesn’t destroy the power structure that exists in the country. Additionally, if there isn’t organized armed opposition on the ground a country can maintain order through relatively crude security forces that are more widespread less concentrated and more independent making them significantly more resilient to an air campaign compared to the regular army. \Additionally, with the widespread use of cellphones, radios and the internet removing a countries’ ability to communicate and coordinate is harder than ever.
Air campaigns can also have the negative effect of rallying a country populating around the government due to the resentment of being attacked. This makes achieving political goals even harder. In almost all countries, even where their governments are unpopular, getting attacked by a foreign power usually will rally the people together. This can have the effect of solidifying the power of the regime in power. This makes a regime vastly more secure which makes replacing them or forcing them to negotiate table harder.
Take the blitz for example the Germany strategic bombing campaign on the UK during the second world war. Rather than causing widespread panic the blitz’s created the “blitz spirit” which was caused the UK to rally and fight on in defiance rather than surrender to the Germans.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1995/january/where-air-power-fails
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1995/august/strategic-air-power-didnt-work
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1996/november/strategic-bombing-always-myth#:~:text=Three%20fundamental%20reasons%20for%20the%20consistent%20failures,targets%20and%20their%20priorities%20were%20ill%20defined.
